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ABSTRACT
A SEARCH BASED ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING IN SIMPLE
ALLOCATION PROBLEMS
RAB·IA TELL·I
Economics, M.A. Thesis, 2016
Supervisor: Özgür K¬br¬s
Keywords: Rationality, Contraction Independence, Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preferences, Search, Consideration Set
In this thesis, we focus on the analysis of rationality for simple allocation problems by
interpreting solution rules as data on the choices of a policy maker. For an inventory of
bankruptcy rules, we show that only constrained equal awards rule satises contraction
independence. In addition, we weaken the rationality axiom and formulate the weak
WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences) property for simple allocation problems.
We conclude that among a class of well-known solutions to simple allocation problems,
the constrained equal awards rule uniquely satises contraction independence and weak
WARP. In order to see the implications of existence of behavioral constraints in making
choice, we next construct a search based model in which the decision maker has to
engage in a dynamic search to adjudicate the conicting claims and chose a division.
Finally, we show that all allocation rules can be rationalized with this simple search
model.
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ÖZET
BAS·IT DA¼GITIM PROBLEMLER·INDE KARAR VERME SÜREC·IN·IN ARAMA
TEMEL·INDE ·INCELENMES·I
RAB·IA TELL·I
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2016
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Özgür K¬br¬s
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rasyonellik, Daralmadan Ba¼g¬ms¬zl¬k, Aç¬¼ga Ç¬kan Tercihlerin
Zay¬f Axiomu, Arama, De¼gerlendirme Seti
Bu tezde, basit da¼g¬t¬m problemlerinin çözüm kurallar¬n¬, bir karar merciinin seçim-
leri ile ilgili veri olarak yorumlay¬p bu basit da¼g¬t¬m problemlerinin rasyonelli¼gi üzerine
odakland¬k. ·Ias problemlerinin çözümü amac¬yla kullan¬lan bir tak¬m kurallar için,
daralmadan ba¼g¬ms¬zl¬k özelli¼gini, sadece s¬n¬rland¬r¬lm¬¸s es¸it ödüllendirme kural¬n¬n
sa¼glad¬¼g¬n¬ gösterdik. Ek olarak, rasyonellik aksiyomunu zay¬att¬k ve aç¬¼ga ç¬kan
tercihlerin zay¬f aksiyomunun daha zay¬f bir versiyonunu, basit da¼g¬t¬m problemleri
için formüle ettik. Basit da¼g¬t¬m problemlerinin çözümü için tan¬mlanm¬¸s, tan¬nm¬¸s
çözümler aras¬nda, s¬n¬rland¬r¬lm¬¸s es¸it ödüllendirme kural¬n¬n daralmadan ba¼g¬ms¬zl¬k
ve aç¬¼ga ç¬kan tercihlerin zay¬f aksiyomunun daha zay¬f bir versiyonunu sa¼glayan tek
kural oldu¼gu sonucuna vard¬k. Seçim yapma sürecinde, davran¬¸ssal k¬s¬tlar¬n varl¬¼g¬n¬n
olas¬sonuçlar¬n¬görmek amac¬yla arama temelli bir model olus¸turduk. Bu modelde,
karar mercii, çak¬¸san hak taleplerini karara ba¼glamak ve bir bölüs¸üm yapmak için di-
namik bir arama sürecine girmek zorundad¬r. Son olarak, bu modelle aç¬klanan bütün
da¼g¬t¬m kurallar¬n¬n rasyonel oldu¼gunu gösterdik.
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1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory relies on the idea that the individuals choice behavior re-
veals underlying preferences that govern it. Most of the earlier work on revealed prefer-
ence theory is related to the applications of these ideas to classical demand theory (e.g.
see Samuelson, 1938, 1948). However, the concept of revealed preference is applicable
to a wide range of choice situations. For example, applications of the theory to bargain-
ing games (Nash, 1950) characterize bargaining rules which can be rationalized as
maximizing the underlying preferences of an impartial arbitrator (or, depending on the
interpretation, a social welfare function of the bargainers) (Peters and Wakker, 1991;
Bossert, 1994; Ok and Zhou, 1999; Sánchez, 2000).
Revealed preference theory assumes that the decision maker is maximizing her prefer-
ences and her choices are the result of this maximizing procedure. As a consequence,
revealed preference theory represents the empirical content of rational decision making
behavior. The theory o¤ers a condition for the choices to be consistent with prefer-
ence maximization. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (hereafter, WARP) is
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for rationality. When the choice is single-valued,
this relevant condition is called Property  in Sen (1971) in the context of consumer
choice, and as independence of irrelevant alternatives in Nash (1950) in the context of
bargaining. This condition requires that the chosen element from a set also be chosen
from every subset that contains it. However, real life choice procedures often violate
these conditions. Instead of classifying this kind of choice procedures as irrational,
alternative explanations for rationality are proposed by recent research that incorpo-
rates the behavioral approach to the rational decision making theory. Rationality is
redened as optimal behavior within the additional constraints such as, loss aversion,
endowment e¤ect, limited attention, status quo bias and temptation. This idea is la-
beled as bounded rationality. As in the case of rationality, it can be applied to a wide
range of decision problems. This observation will be the starting point of this thesis.
In this thesis, we analyze concepts of rationality on a class of simple allocation problems.
The implications of full rationality on these problems has been previously analyzed by
K¬br¬s (2012, 2013) who carries out a revealed preference analysis. A simple allocation
problem for a societyN is an jN j+1 dimensional nonnegative real vector (c1; :::cjNj ; E) 2
RN+ satisfying
P
N ci  E where E, the endowment has to be allocated among agents in
N who are characterized by c, the characteristic vector. By interpreting an allocation
rule on simple allocation problems as representing the choices of a decision maker (e.g.
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a policy maker or a bankruptcy judge), K¬br¬s (2012, 2013) analyzes the conditions
under which an allocation rule can be rationalized as maximizing a binary relation. It
states that contraction independence property is equivalent to the rationality of a rule.
The main purpose of the allocation literature is to determine well-behaved rules for
associating with each problem a division between the claimants of the amount available.
Simple allocation problems have a wide range of applications. These are analyzed in
detail in K¬br¬s (2012) and we will give them in the subsection 1.1. Even though
relative importance of the rules depends on the application, there are several rules that
are commonly used in practice or discussed in theoretical work. Throughout this paper,
we analyze the rules used in the bankruptcy literature. In the section 2, we will present
these rules that are compiled in Thomson (2003, 2012).
The thesis is organized as follows. In Section 3, we analyze rationality of the inventory of
rules described in the section 2. As in K¬br¬s (2012, 2013) we assume that the allocation
rule represents the choice of a decision maker. We make our analysis based on the
contraction independence property. We identify the rules that violate this property by
giving an example for two and three agent case. We show that the only rational rule is
constrained equal awards rule (also known as the equal gains rule) for the reason that
its operation principle is based on equal division and thus, is independent of the agents
characteristics values. It treats them as constraints in the application of this principle.
In Section 4, we weaken the rationality axiom and introduce a new property called
weak WARP proposed by Manzini and Mariotti (2007). This property requires that if a
decrease in the characteristics values does not change the initially chosen allocation, this
allocation has to be chosen for the characteristic values between the initial and decreased
characteristic values. This property captures the existence of menu dependence in a
consistent manner. Change of choice set may lead to change of preferences. However,
if the larger set does not contain any reason for the choice reversal, no smaller menu
contains such a reason either. We check which one of the rules satises this weak
rationality axiom.
In Section 5, we characterize a search model in which the choice process is generated
by a time-continuous dynamic search. The decision maker looks through alternatives
continuously and uses them to construct consideration sets. Then, she chooses the best
alternative in order to maximize utility on the intersection of the choice set and the
consideration set. Our main assumption is that the decision maker cannot consider all
alternatives due to lack of information or unawareness. Therefore, she must actively
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search for alternatives. She starts the search with origin, at that point each claimant
gets nothing and terminates search when the characteristic vector is considered. We
identify preferences and search paths for most commonly used rules: Proportional rule,
constrained equal awards rule, constrained equal losses rule and the Talmud rule. We
then, show that every rule can be rationalizable by this search model.
1.1 Applications of Simple Allocation Problems
A simple allocation problem for a society N is an jN j + 1 dimensional nonnegative
real vector (c1; :::cjNj ; E), which, with the exception of the last application below, is
interpreted as follows. A social endowment E of a perfectly divisible commodity is to
be allocated among members of N . Each agent i 2 N is characterized by an amount ci
of the commodity. Next, we present the alternative interpretations of c and E at various
applications. These applications are discussed in detail in K¬br¬s (2012). Therefore, we
present them as in that paper.
1. Taxation: A public authority is to collect an amount E of tax from a society
N . Each agent i has income ci. This is a central and very old problem in public
nance. For example, see Edgeworth (1898) and the following literature. Young
(1987) proposes a class of parametric solutionsto this problem.
2. Bankruptcy: A bankruptcy judge is to allocate the remaining assets E of a
bankrupt rm among its creditors, N . Each agent i has credited ci to the bankrupt
rm and now, claims this amount. For example, see ONeill (1982) and the
following literature. For a detailed review of the extensive literature on taxation
and bankruptcy problems, see Thomson (2003 and 2007).
3. Permit Allocation: The Environmental Protection Agency is to allocate an
amount E of pollution permits among rms in N (such as CO2 emission permits
allocated among energy producers). Each rm i, depending on its location, is
imposed by the local authority an emission constraint ci on its pollution level.
For more on this application, see K¬br¬s (2003) and the literature cited therein.
4. Single-peaked or Saturated Preferences: A social planner is to allocate E
units of a perfectly divisible commodity among members of N . Each agent i
is known to have preferences with peak (saturation point) ci. The rest of the
preference information is disregarded as typical in several well-known solutions to
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this problem, such as the Uniform rule or the Proportional rule. For example, see
Sprumont (1991) and the following literature.
5. Demand Rationing: A supplier is to allocate its production E among deman-
ders inN . Each demander i demands ci units of the commodity. The supply-chain
management literature contains detailed analysis of this problem. For example,
see Cachon and Lariviere (1999) and the literature cited therein.
6. Bargaining with Quasilinear Preferences and Claims: An arbitrator is to
allocate E units of a numeriare good among agents who have quasilinear prefer-
ences with respect to it. Each agent holds a claim ci on what he should receive.
For examples of bargaining problems with claims, see Chun and Thomson (1992)
and the following literature. For bargaining problems with quasilinear preferences,
see Moulin (1985) and the following literature.
7. Surplus Sharing: A social planner is to allocate the return E of a project among
its investors in N . Each investor i has invested si. The project is protable, that
is,
P
N si  E. Using the principal that no agent should receive less than his
investment, dene the maximal share of an agent i as ci = E  
P
Nnfig sj . Note
that
P
N ci  E. The surplus sharing problem can now be analyzed as a simple
allocation problem. For more on surplus-sharing problems, see Moulin (1985 and
1987) and the following literature.
8. Consumer Choice under xed prices and rationing: A consumer has to
allocate his income E among a set N of commodities. The prices of the com-
modities are xed and thus, do not change from one problem to another. (With
appropriate choice of consumption units, normalize the price vector so that all
commodities have the same price.) As typical in the xed-price literature, the
consumer also faces rationing constraintson how much he can consume of each
commodity. Let ci be the agents consumption constraint on commodity i. See
Benassy, 1993 or K¬br¬s and Küçüksenel, 2008, for more on rationing rules.
2 Literature Review
Revealed preference theory is described rstly in Samuelson (1938). By using the se-
lected overexpression, he actually dened the well known Weak Axiom of Revealed
4
Preference. Samuelsons paper stimulated a signicant amount of theoretical and empir-
ical work and revealed preference literature has grown rapidly. Varian (2005) presents
a detailed survey starting from Samuelsons seminal work. His paper o¤ers an un-
derstanding about the development of the literature. However, in recent years, the
standard theory of individual decision making evolved into an area which suggests that
the study of choice procedures may yield better understanding of choice behavior. The
experimental and theoretical work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) led to take into
consideration the behavioral analysis of economic decision making.
Experimental evidence discussed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) shows that the
individuals make their choices by taking into account the status quo option. By using
the current option as a reference point, they determine their preferences. Thus, change
of reference option leads to change of preferences. In light of this information, the
paper tries to construct a reference dependent choice theory based on the reference
dependence, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity assumptions which are ignored
by standard rational choice models.
Masatl¬o¼glu and Ok (2004) formulates a rational choice theory which allows for the
presence of the status quo bias. Their axiomatic choice model incorporates the standard
choice theory as a special case (the absence of a status quo). Their model allows for
choice reversals conditional on default option in the sense that a status quo point may
alter the individuals choices even if it is not chosen.
Dean, K¬br¬s and Masatl¬o¼glu (2015) develops a model that captures both status quo
bias and limited attention phenomenon. They construct their model based on the
following assumptions. First of all, decision maker has limited attention and status
quo always receives attention. Moreover, status quo bias becomes more prevalent when
the choice set expands. This pattern is called choice overload. Secondly, they assume
that a status quo option may cause the decision maker to eliminate some alternatives by
constructing some sort of consideration sets. They also provide experimental evidence to
show that their assumptions are necessary to explain status quo biased choice behavior.
Manzini and Mariotti (2007) denes a procedure in which the decision maker uses se-
quentially two asymmetric binary relations (rationales) to account for cyclical choice
patterns. The rationales are applied in a xed order. While the rst rational removes
inferior alternatives, the second rational determines the chosen alternatives from the
narrowed set. Their elimination approach can explain a limited form of menu depen-
dence.
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A di¤erent approach to explain the choice procedures that are inconsistent with stan-
dard choice theory is pursued in Masatl¬o¼glu and Nakajima (2012). They eliminate one
of its main assumptions. They assume that decision maker may not evaluate simulta-
neously all alternatives in the choice set. As well as, they formulate a behavioral search
model by using consideration sets. These sets evolve during the course of search and
provide a dynamic decision procedure. The major novelty of the paper is the explicit
formalization of the evolution of the consideration set over time.
Thomson (2003, 2013) provides a detailed review of the literature on taxation and
bankruptcy problems. He presents the rules and their properties when the number
of agent is xed or varying; compares the rules on the basis of these properties. His
surveys cover an axiomatic and game theoretic modeling of allocation problems and
discuss experimental testing of the theory devoted to adjudicate the conicting claims.
K¬br¬s (2012) analyzes rationality and transitive rationality notions for simple alloca-
tion problems. Rationality of a rule is about whether its choices can be modeled as
maximization of a binary relation. That is, a rule is said to be rational (transitive ra-
tional) if its choices coincide with maximization of a (transitive) binary relation on the
allocation space. He shows that rationalizability is equivalent to WARP. Additionally,
contraction independence and WARP imply each other. K¬br¬s also introduces a weak
rationality property which allows a rule to maximize a di¤erent binary relation for each
characteristic vector. However, he shows that every rule satises weak rationality. In
the same spirit, K¬br¬s (2013) characterizes a family of rational rules named recursive
rules by using other well known axioms in the literature.
Stovall (2014) characterized the family of asymmetric parametric rules on the basis
of the family of symmetric parametric rules (Young, 1987). In that paper, Youngs
characterization becomes a special case of the family of asymmetric parametric rules.
Moreover, Stovall (2014) characterizes a family of rules which can be described in three
di¤erent ways by imposing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Consistency and
Resource Monotonicity on the rules. He states that these three axioms characterize
each of following families of rules, and thus these families are in fact one and the same.
He refers to the rst solution concept as monotone path rules that are identied with
the path of awards for a given claims vector. He gives the name of claims independent
parametric rules to second family of rules which are identied with a set of parametric
functions. Collectively rational additively separable (CRAS) rules are the third one
that is identied with an additively separable, strictly concave social welfare function.
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3 Simple Allocation Problems
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents. For i 2 N , let ei be the ith unit vector in RN+ .
Let e =
P
N ei. We use the vector inequalities, 5;; < :1.
A simple allocation problem for N is a pair (c; E) 2 RN+ R+ such that
P
N ci  E
(please see Figure 1). We call E the endowment and c the characteristic vector.
As discussed at the end of Section 1; depending on the application, E can be an asset
or a liability and c can be a vector of incomes, claims, demands, preference peaks, or
consumption constraints. Let C be the set of all simple allocation problems for N .
Given a simple allocation problem (c; E) 2 C, let X(c; E) = fx 2 RN+ j x 5 c andP
N xi 5 Eg be the choice set of (c; E).
Figure 1: A two-agent simple allocation
problem
Figure 2: A three-agent simple allocation
problem
An allocation rule F : C ! RN+ assigns each simple allocation problem (c; E) to
an allocation F (c; E) 2 X(c; E) such that PN Fi(c; E) = E: Each rule F satises
F (c; E) 5 c which, depending on the application, might be interpreted as a consumption
constraint (as in permit allocation) or an e¢ ciency requirement (as in single-peaked
preferences). Also,
P
N Fi(c; E) = E can be interpreted as an e¢ ciency property (as in
permit allocation) or feasibility requirement (as in taxation). In consumer choice, this
condition is equivalent to the Walras law.
F (c; E) is called also an awards vector for (c; E): Given a claims vector, the graphical
1That is, x 5 y if and only if xi 5 yi for each i 2 N ; x  y if and only if x 5 y and x 6= y; x < y if
and only if xi < yi for each i 2 N .
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location of the awards vector chosen by a rule as the endowment varies from 0 to the
sum of the claims
P
ci; is the path of awards of the rule for the claims vector.
Figure 3: Paths of awards of four central rules for N = f1; 2g. (a) Proportional rule.
(b) Constrained equal awards rule (c) Constrained equal losses rule. (d) Talmud Rule
3.1 An Inventory of Rules
We introduce an inventory of most commonly used rules in literature as dened in the
surveys of Thomson (2003 & 2015). They are dened for a xed N .
Proportional Rule: The proportional rule is one of the best known rules. It allocates
the endowment proportional to the claims.
 For each (c; E) 2 C; P (c; E) = c where  is chosen so that Pci = E:
Constrained Equal Awards Rule: This rule allocates equal amount to all claimants
subject to no agent receiving more than his claim. It involves the idea of equality and
favors the agents who have the smallest claims. Because of these properties, it has a
central role in the literature.
 For each (c; E) 2 C and each i 2 N; CEAi = minfci; g; where  is chosen so
that
P
minfci; g = E:
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PinilesRule: It is based on a double application of the constrained equal awards
rule. It uses the half-claims instead of the claims themselves.
 For each (c; E) 2 C and each i 2 N; Pini(c; E) = CEAi(c=2; E) if
P
(cj=2)  E;
and Pini(c; E) = ci=2 + CEAi(c=2; E  
P
(cj=2)) otherwise.
Constrained Egalitarian Rule: This rule recommends an egalitarian division con-
cept and proposes the constrained equal awards rule for the half claims until the endow-
ment reaches the sum of the half claims. When the endowment is more than the half
sum of the claims, each agent receives the maximum of his half claim and minfci; g
where  is set so that awards add up to E.
 For each (c; E) 2 C and each i 2 N; CEi(c; E) = minfci=2; g if E 
P
(cj=2)
and CEi(c; E) = maxfci=2;minfci; gg otherwise, where in each case,  is chosen
so that
P
CEi(c; E) = E:
Constrained Equal Losses Rule: This rule proposes an awards vector which equal-
izes the losses imposed to the agents subject to no agent receiving a negative amount.
In opposition to constrained equal awards rule, it favors the agents who have the largest
claims.
 For each (c; E) 2 C and each i 2 N; CELi(c; E) = maxf0; ci   g, where  is
chosen so that
P
maxf0; ci   g = E.
Concede-and-divide: This rule is dened only for the two-claimant case. It rst
assigns to each claimant the di¤erence between the endowment and the other agents
claim (or 0 if this di¤erence is negative), and divides the remainder equally.
 For jN j = 2: For each (c; E) 2 C and each i 2 N;
CDi(c; E) = maxfE   cj; 0g+ E 
P
maxNfE ck; 0g
2
:
Talmud Rule: This rule is a mixture of constrained equal awards and constrained
equal losses. For an endowment less than the half-sum of the claims, the constrained
equal awards rule is applied; if there is more, the constrained equal losses rule is utilized.
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 For each (c; E) 2 C and each i 2 N;
1. If
P
(ci=2)  E, then Ti(c; E) = minfci=2; g; where  is chosen so thatP
minfci=2; g = E.
2. If
P
(ci=2)  E, then Ti(c; E) = ci  minfci=2; g, where  is chosen so thatP
[ci  minfci=2; g] = E:
Random Arrival Rule: This rule uses the following pattern: It compensates fully
each claimant with respect to the order of the claimants arrival until the endowment
runs out. All orders are given equal probabilities and the average of the awards vectors
obtained by this pattern is taken to remove the unfairness associated with a particular
order. In the following formal denition, N refers to the class of bijections from N
into itself.
 For each (c; E) 2 C and each i 2 N;
RAi(c; E) =
1
n!
P
2N
min
(
ci;max
(
E   P cj; 0
j2N; (j)<(i)
))
:
ICI Family: This rule is described as in Thomson (2012).
 The ICI family (Thomson, 2000, 2008b) generalizes the Talmud rule. The pattern
of distribution is the same but the denition allows the critical values of the
endowment at which claimants come in and out of the distribution to di¤er from
the half-claims, and moreover, to depend on the claims vector. To specify a rule
in the family, we need lists F  (Fk)k=n 1k=1 and G  (Gk)k=n 1k=1 (where n  jN j) of
functions from RN+ to R+ such that for each pair k; k0 2 f1; :::; n 1g with k < k0,
Fk0  Fk0 and Gk0  Gk. Let c 2 RN+ be given, and let E grow from 0 to
P
ci. The
distribution is as follows. The rst units are divided equally until E reaches F1(c),
at which point the smallest claimant drops out for a while. The next units are
divided equally among the others until E reaches F2(c), at which point the second
smallest claimant also drops out for a while. This goes on until E reaches Fn 1(c),
at which point only the largest claimant is left; he receives each additional unit
until E reaches Gn 1(c). The other claimants return for more, one at a time, in
the reverse order of their departure. As E increases from Gn 1(c) to Gn 2(c), each
increment is divided equally between the two largest claimants, and so on. The
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process continues until E reaches G1(c), at which point each increment is divided
equally among all claimants, and until the end. To guarantee that then, each agent
receives exactly his claim, the lists F (c)  (Fk(c))k=n 1k=1 and G(c)  (Gk(c))k=n 1k=1
have to satisfy certain linear relations, the ICI relations.
Parametric Rule of Representation: This rule is described as in Thomson (2012).
 Let  be the family of functions f : R+ [; ]! R+, where  1      1
that are continuous, nowhere decreasing with respect to their second argument,
and such that for each c0 2 R+, we have f(c0;  ) = 0 and f(c0;  ) = c0: The
parametric rule of representation f 2 ; Sf , is dened as follows: for each N 2 N
and each (c; E) 2 CN , Sf (c; E) is the awards vector x such that for some  2 [;
] , and for each i 2 N; xi = f(ci; ):
4 Analysis of Rationality For Division Rules
An allocation rule on simple allocation problems can be interpreted as data on the
choices of a decision maker. In that context, a rule can be qualied as rational if
there is a binary relation dened on RN+ for a given rule such that for each problem,
the awards vector chosen by the rule is the unique maximizer of the relation over
the choice set of the problem. Rationalizability is equivalent to theWeak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP) which can be equivalently stated as follows: for each
pair (c; E); (c0; E) 2 C, F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E) and F (c; E) 6= F (c0; E) implies F (c0; E) =2
X(c; E): WARP requires the binary relation to be antisymmetric2 (K¬br¬s, 2012).
The counterpart of WARP for allocation rules can be dened as follows: A rule F
satises contraction independence if a chosen alternative from a set is still chosen
from subsets (contractions) that contain it: For each pair (c; E); (c0; E) 2 C; F (c; E) 2
X(c0; E)  X(c; E) implies F (c0; E) = F (c; E): For an allocation rule, WARP and
contraction independence imply each other. As a result, rationality is equivalent to
contraction independence. The following lemma provides a simple way of controlling
whether a rule satises the contraction independence (K¬br¬s, 2012).
Lemma 1 A rule F satises contraction independence if and only if for each (c; E);
(c0; E) 2 C it satises the following properties
2A binary relation B on RN+ is antisymmetric if for each x; y 2 RN+ ; xBy and yBx imply x = y.
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Property (i). if for each i 2 N , minfci; Eg = minfc0i; Eg , then F (c; E) = F (c0; E),
Property (ii). if F (c; E)  c0  c, then F (c0; E) = F (c; E).
Constrained equal awards rule is the only rule that satises contraction independence
among the rules presented in the Section 3. The following proposition provides a general
proof.
Proposition 2 Constrained Equal Awards Rule satises contraction independence.
Proof. For each (c; E) 2 C; Fi(c; E) = minfci; (c; E)g; where (c; E) is chosen so
that
P
minfci; (c; E)g = E: Let (c; E); (c0; E) 2 C be such that F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E) 
X(c; E): We want to show that F (c; E) = F (c0; E): If X(c0; E)  X(c; E); then for
each i 2 N; either c0i 5 ci or minfc0i; Eg = minfci; Eg: If F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E); then
Fi(c; E) 5 c0i: Assume initially that for each i 2 N; Fi(c; E) 5 c0i 5 ci:
Let F (c; E) be such that Fi(c; E) = ci for all i 2 f1; :::kg and Fj(c; E) < cj for all
j 2 fk + 1; :::; ng: Suppose F (c0; E) 6= F (c; E): Then, there exists fi; jg 2 N such
that Fi(c0; E) < Fi(c; E) and Fj(c0; E) > Fj(c; E): Now, j =2 f1; :::; kg since otherwise,
Fj(c; E) = cj = c
0
j: So j 2 fk + 1; :::; ng: That is Fj(c; E) < cj: Then, there exists two
cases.
Case 1: i 2 f1; :::; kg: Then, Fi(c0; E) < Fi(c; E) = ci = c0i and Fi(c0; E) = (c0; E):We
know that Fj(c0; E) = minfc0j; (c0; E)g  (c0; E): However, we claim that Fj(c0; E) >
Fj(c; E) = (c; E) > Fi(c; E) > Fi(c
0; E) = (c0; E): Then, we obtain Fj(c0; E) >
(c0; E); a contradiction.
Case 2: i 2 fk + 1; :::; ng: Then, Fi(c; E) = Fj(c; E) = (c; E): We have Fi(c0; E) <
Fi(c; E)  c0i and Fj(c0; E) > Fj(c; E); Fj(c; E) < c0j: Fi(c0; E) < c0i; then Fi(c0; E) =
(c0; E):Altogether, these imply Fj(c0; E) > Fj(c; E) = (c; E) = Fi(c; E) > Fi(c0; E) =
(c0; E): Then, we obtain Fj(c0; E) > (c0; E); a contradiction.
Secondly, for the case that minfc0i; Eg = minfci; Eg, the proof follows the same con-
struction.
In the following subsections, we focus on the rules other than the contrained equal
awards rule for two and three agent case.
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4.1 Two-Agent Problems
In this section, we show that the rules other than the constrained equal awards, all
violate contraction independence and thus, are not rational for two-agent problems.
Proposition 3 Proportional Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c = (10; 2); c0 = (9; 2) and
E = 10. Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E). However,
F (c; E) = (25
3
; 5
3
) 6= F (c0; E) = (90
11
; 20
11
), violating contraction independence.
Proposition 4 PinilesRule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c = (14; 6); c0 = (12; 6) and
E = 10: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E): However,
F (c; E) = (7; 3) 6= F (c0; E) = (6:5; 3:5); violating contraction independence.
Proposition 5 Constrained Egalitarian Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c = (14; 6); c0 = (12; 6) and
E = 10: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E): However,
F (c; E) = (7; 3) 6= F (c0; E) = (6; 4); violating contraction independence.
Proposition 6 Constrained Equal Losses Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c = (10; 2); c0 = (10; 1) and
E = 10: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E): However,
F (c; E) = (9; 1) 6= F (c0; E) = (8:5; 1:5); violating contraction independence.
Proposition 7 Concede and Divide violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c = (10; 2); c0 = (10; 1) and
E = 10: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E): However,
F (c; E) = (9; 1) 6= F (c0; E) = (9:5; 0:5); violating contraction independence.
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Proposition 8 Talmud Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. For the two-claimant case, concede and divide rule delivers the numbers pro-
posed by the Talmud.
Proposition 9 Random Arrival Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c = (10; 2); c0 = (10; 1) and
E = 10: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E): However,
F (c; E) = (9; 1) 6= F (c0; E) = (9:5; 0:5) violating contraction independence.
4.2 Three-Agent Problems
In this section, we show that the rules other than the constrained equal awards, all
violate contraction independence and thus, are not rational for three-agent problems.
Proposition 10 Proportional Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c = (10; 8; 6); c0 = (10; 7; 5)
and E = 20: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E): How-
ever, F (c; E) = (25
3
; 20
3
; 5) 6= F (c0; E) = (100
11
; 70
11
; 50
11
) violating contraction independence.
Proposition 11 PinilesRule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c = (10; 8; 6); c0 = (8; 8; 6)
and E = 20: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E): How-
ever, F (c; E) = (23
3
; 20
3
; 17
3
) 6= F (c0; E) = (7; 7; 6) violating contraction independence.
Proposition 12 Constrained Egalitarian Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c = (10; 8; 6); c0 = (6; 4; 4);
and E = 12: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E):
However, F (c; E) = (5; 4; 3) 6= F (c0; E) = (4; 4; 4) violating contraction independence.
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Proposition 13 Constrained Equal Losses Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c = (10; 8; 8); c0 = (10; 7; 6)
and E = 20: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E):
However, F (c; E) = (8; 6; 6) 6= F (c0; E) = (9; 6; 5) violating contraction independence.
Proposition 14 Talmud Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c = (10; 8; 8); c0 = (10; 7; 6)
and E = 20: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E):
However, F (c; E) = (8; 6; 6) 6= F (c0; E) = (9; 6; 5) violating contraction independence.
Proposition 15 Random Arrival Rule violates contraction independence.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c = (10; 8; 8); c0 = (10; 7; 6)
and E = 20: Since c0  c; we have X(c0; E)  X(c; E). Also F (c; E) 2 X(c0; E):
However, F (c; E) = (8; 6; 6) 6= F (c0; E) = (9; 6; 5) violating contraction independence.
5 Weak WARP
From the previous section, we conclude that majority of the well known division rules
violate rationality axioms. To explain choice patterns that are inconsistent with full
rationality, alternative motivation and procedures of choice are proposed. One of these
alternative explanations is related to menu dependence. Experimental evidence shows
that a decision makers preferences may depend on the set she confronts. Therefore,
cyclical patterns of choice can be described by this choice procedure. In this sense,
Manzini andMariotti (2007) proposed a property called weakWARPwhich allows menu
dependence but requires some consistency between choices. Suppose that alternative x
is chosen over y in a small set and in a larger set including this small set. This condition
reveals that there is no reason for choice reversal between x and y. As a result, in a
subset of the larger set which includes the small set, x has to be chosen over y.
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In the same spirit, we formulate a similar property with Manzini and Mariotti (2007)
and we call it again weak WARP to capture bounded rationality and examine whether
the rules satisfy it. Accordingly, weak WARP can be stated as follows: for the pairs
(c1; E); (c2; E); (c3; E) 2 C; such that c1  c2  c3 and x 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E) 
X(c3; E); if x = F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) then x = F (c2; E):
In what follows we will show that constrained equal awards is the only rule that satises
weak WARP.
Proposition 16 Constrained Equal Awards Rule satises weak WARP.
Proof. Since the Constrained Equal Awards rule satises the stronger Contraction
Independence axiom, it also satises weak WARP.
5.1 Two-Agent Problems
In this section, we show that the rules other than the constrained equal awards, all
violate weak WARP for two-agent problems.
Proposition 17 Proportional Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c3 = (10; 4); c2 = (9; 3:5);
c1 = (8; 3:2) and E = 10: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E):
Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However, F (c1; E) =
F (c3; E) = (7:14; 2:86) 6= F (c2; E) = (7:2; 2:8) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 18 PinilesRule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c3 = (10; 4); c2 = (8; 4);
c1 = (6:5; 3:5) and E = 10: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E) 
X(c3; E): Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However,
F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) = (6:5; 3:5) 6= F (c2; E) = (6; 4) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 19 Constrained Egalitarian Rule violates weak WARP.
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Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c3 = (10; 4); c2 = (8; 3);
c1 = (5; 2) and E = 7: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E):
Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However, F (c1; E) =
F (c3; E) = (5; 2) 6= F (c2; E) = (4; 3) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 20 Constrained Equal Losses Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c3 = (10; 4); c2 = (9; 4);
c1 = (9; 3) and E = 10: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E):
Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However, F (c1; E) =
F (c3; E) = (8; 2) 6= F (c2; E) = (7:5; 2:5) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 21 Concede and Divide violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c3 = (10; 4); c2 = (10; 3);
c1 = (9; 3) and E = 10: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E):
Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However, F (c1; E) =
F (c3; E) = (8; 2) 6= F (c2; E) = (8:5; 1:5) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 22 Talmud Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Example: for the two-claimant case, concede and divide rule delivers the num-
bers proposed by the Talmud.
Proposition 23 Random Arrival Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2g; c3 = (10; 4); c2 = (10; 2);
c1 = (8; 2) and E = 10: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E):
Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However, F (c1; E) =
F (c3; E) = (8; 2) 6= F (c2; E) = (9; 1) violating weak WARP.
5.2 Three-Agent Problems
In this section, we show that the rules other than the constrained equal awards, all
violate weak WARP for three-agent problems.
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Proposition 24 Proportional Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c3 = (10; 8; 6); c2 =
(10; 7; 5); c1 = (25
3
; 20
3
; 5) and E = 20: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E) 
X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E):
However, F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) = (25
3
; 20
3
; 5)) 6= F (c2; E) = (100
11
; 70
11
; 50
11
) violating weak
WARP.
Proposition 25 PinilesRule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c3 = (10; 8; 6); c2 = (8; 8; 6);
c1 = (23
3
; 20
3
; 17
3
) and E = 20: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E) 
X(c3; E): Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However,
F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) = (23
3
; 20
3
; 17
3
) 6= F (c2; E) = (7; 7; 6) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 26 Constrained Egalitarian Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c3 = (10; 8; 6); c2 = (6; 4; 4);
c1 = (5; 4; 3) and E = 12: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E):
Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However, F (c1; E) =
F (c3; E) = (5; 4; 3) 6= F (c2; E) = (4; 4; 4) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 27 Constrained Equal Losses Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c3 = (10; 8; 8); c2 =
(10; 7; 6); c1 = (8; 6; 6) and E = 20: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E) 
X(c3; E): Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However,
F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) = (8; 6; 6) 6= F (c2; E) = (9; 6; 5) violating weak WARP.
Proposition 28 Talmud Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c3 = (10; 8; 8); c2 =
(10; 7; 6); c1 = (8; 6; 6) and E = 20: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E) 
X(c3; E): Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However,
F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) = (8; 6; 6) 6= F (c2; E) = (9; 6; 5) violating weak WARP.
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Proposition 29 Random Arrival Rule violates weak WARP.
Proof. Consider the following economy. Let N = f1; 2; 3g; c3 = (10; 8; 8); c2 =
(10; 7; 6); c1 = (8; 6; 6) and E = 20: Since c1  c2  c3; we have X(c1; E)  X(c2; E) 
X(c3; E): Also F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) 2 X(c1; E)  X(c2; E)  X(c3; E): However,
F (c1; E) = F (c3; E) = (8; 6; 6) 6= F (c2; E) = (9; 6; 5) violating weak WARP.
Before the presentation of our simple search model, we should mention that every
distinct member of a family of rules may have di¤erent properties. In the same vein, ICI
family (abbreviation of Increasing-Constant-Increasing expression) is a generalization of
the Talmud rule and has innitely many members. For this family, instead of the half-
sum of the claims as in the Talmud rule, the points at which agents temporarily stop
receiving additional units and the points at which they come back can be determined
by the claims vector. The family contains constrained equal awards rule as well as the
rules that violate contraction independence and weak WARP such as the constrained
equal losses, and Talmud rules.
Parametric Rules also have innitely many members and contains the rules that violate
contraction independence and weak WARP such as the proportional, constrained equal
losses, Talmud, and Pinilesrules. However, Stovall (2014) characterizes a sub-family of
the asymmetric parametric rules. In that paper, this sub-family is formulated as follows:
A parametric function is dened for each claimant and each parametric function depends
only on a single parameter, in which it is weakly increasing. For any problem, each
parametric function is truncated by the individuals claim, and a common parameter is
found so that the sum of the truncated parametric functions evaluated at that parameter
equals the endowment. These rules are called as claims independent parametric rules
and satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom.
6 Search Model for Simple Allocation Problems
Incomplete information about alternatives or lack of cognitive capacity may yield to
failure in choosing the best available option. Hence, existence of such constraints is in
contrast with the full rationality. In order to summarize choice behavior under these
constraints, search based models are considered as an alternative theoretical framework.
Since we think of a simple allocation problem as a choice problem, we design a simple
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search model in which the decision maker (bankruptcy judge or policy maker) makes a
search to explore the choice set and to select a division.
Our choice process is generated by a time-continuous dynamic search. At time t = 0, no
choice is to be made and each claimant gets nothing. For time t > 0, the decision maker
searches continuously and constructs the consideration set with the options that are paid
attention until time t. She stops searching when the characteristic vector is considered.
At the end of the search, some considered options may not be available. Thus, the
decision maker compares the alternatives in the intersection of the consideration set
and the choice set. She reveals her nal choice by maximizing a preference relation.
In our model, the search path reects the consideration set formation process. The
consideration set can be dened as the search history at time t. Because of the generality
of our model, each rule performs adequately across the search model.
6.1 Model
Our search model consists of two components: a preference relation and the search
path.
A preference relation denoted by  is a strict order over the alternative space, RN+
3: For a given (c; E); an alternative x 2 RN+ is -best in X(c; E), denoted x =
arg maxX(c; E) if x  y for each y 2 X(c; E).
The search path denes for a given c 2 RN+ the alternative that is considered at a
particular time t 2 [0; 1] in the search process. The search starts with no division.
Once the characteristic vector is considered, the decision maker nalizes the search
process.
Denition 30 A search path is a mapping f : [0; 1]  RN+ ! RN+ such that for each
i 2 N and c 2 RN+ , fi (:; c) is nondecreasing, f(0; c) = 0 and f(1; c) = c: At every time
t, f(t; c) represents the alternative considered at that time during the search process.
The search history is the set of all alternatives that the decision maker have considered
by the end of t 2 [0; 1]. While search continues, the search history expands.
3A binary relation  on RN+ is a strict order over RN+ if it is asymmetric (x  y implies not y  x)
and negatively transitive (not x  y and not y  z imply not x  z).
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Denition 31 The search history at time t 2 [0; 1] and claims vector c 2 RN+ is At(c) =
tS
s=0
f(s; c):
We can now state that an allocation rule F is consistent with the search model if the
following denition is satised:
Denition 32 F is rationalized by a search model if there is a search path f and a
preference relation  such that for each c; E, and t = EP
ci
; F (c; E) = arg maxAt(c).
This simple search model rationalizes all bankruptcy rules, therefore it provides a gen-
eral framework about the search behavior of the decision maker for simple allocation
problems. Because of its generality, it can be taken as a base model. For further stud-
ies, additional structure and restriction can be imposed in order to construct a more
informative model. We now state our main result.
Proposition 33 Any allocation rule can be rationalized with a (; f(t; c)) pair.
Proof. Dene  as represented by the function U(x) = Pxi: Dene f for all c and
for all s as f(s; c) = F (c; s
P
ci): Pick any c; E. Let t = EP
ci
: We now want to show
that F (c; E) = arg maxAt(c). Let F (c; E) = x: By construction, At(c) = fx 2 RN+
j x = F (c; E 0) for all 0  E 0  tP cig: This implies x 2 At(c) : Suppose there is
y 2 At(c) such that y  x: By construction of ;
P
yi >
P
xi = E: In that case
y =2 At(c) ; a contradiction.
By using the search path construction used in the proof, we can explicitly dene search
paths for the commonly used rules.
 A Search Path for Proportional Rule: The most-known rule is the proportional
rule. One of the search path of this rule can be dened as follows:
fP (s; c) = s  c where s 2 [0; 1] (1)
 A Search Path for Constrained Equal Awards Rule (fCEA): An important way of
selecting a division between the claimants is constrained equal awards rule. By
dening its explicit search path, the alternative considered at a particular time in
the search process will be apparent.
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f(s,c) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(s
n
; s
n
; :::; s
n
) if s 2 [0; nc1

]
(c1;
s c1
n 1 ; :::;
s c1
n 1 ) if s 2 [nc1 ; (n 1)c2+c1 ]
(c1; c2;
s (c1+c2)
n 2 ; :::;
s (c1+c2)
n 2 ) if s 2 [ (n 1)c2+c1 ; (n 2)c3+c1+c2 ]
...
...
...
(c1;c2; :::; cn 1;
s  (c1 + c2 + :::+ cn 1)
if s 2 [2cn 1+c1+:::+cn 2

; c1+c2+:::+cn 1+cn

]
(2)
where  =
P
ci
 Search Path for Constrained Equal Losses Rule (fCEL): This rule can be consid-
ered as a counter part of the constrained equals awards rule in terms of losses.
The following formula gives us its explicit search path.
f(s,c) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(0; 0; :::; 0; s) if s 2 [0; cn cn 1

]
(0; :::0; s (cn cn 1)
2
; s+(cn cn 1)
2
) if s 2 [ cn cn 1

; cn+cn 1 2cn 2

]
(0; :::; s (2cn 1 cn cn 2)
3
;
s (2cn cn 1 cn 2)
3
)
if s 2 [ cn+cn 1 2cn 2

; cn+cn 1+cn 2 3cn 3

]
...
...
...
(s+((n 1)c1 c2 ::: cn)
n
; :::;
s+((n 1)cn c1 ::: cn 1)
n
)
if s 2 [ cn+cn 1::: (n 1)c1

; c1+c2+:::+cn 1+cn

]
(3)
where  =
P
ci
 A Search Path for Talmud Rule: The following function is a compact formulation
of the search path of the Talmud Rule.
fT =
(
fCEA(s; c
2
) if 0  s  0:5
fCEL(s; c
2
) if 0:5  s  1 (4)
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7 Conclusion
In this study, we rst focus on the analysis of rationality for simple allocation problems.
We take the contraction independence property as equivalent to rationality. For an
inventory of bankruptcy rules, we show that only constrained equal awards rule satises
the contraction independence. We then weaken the rationality axiom and formulate the
weak WARP property for simple allocation rules. We see that constrained equal awards
rule uniquely satises the contraction independence and weak WARP.
In real life choice problems, all available alternatives may not be observed and evaluated
fairly by the decision maker. As a result, people in general follow a search process in
order to gure out complicated decision problems. Since we treat simple allocation
problems as choice problems, we develop a simple search model in which the decision
maker (or policy maker) has to engage in a dynamic search to adjudicate the conicting
claims. We show that all simple allocation rules can be rationalized with this simple
search model. Therefore, our model is not falsiable. On the other hand, even if being
not falsiable is a major limitation, it provides a general framework to summarize the
behavior of the decision maker in simple allocation problems. Hence, our work can
be used as a starting point. For further research, alternative special models can be
formulated to analyze choices under di¤erent restrictions on consideration sets.
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